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1. Introduction
For societies with n agents facing a set Z of alternatives, a social choice function
determines what alternative to choose for each possible prole of preferences. The
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (see Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975))
establishes that all social choice functions whose range contains more than two
alternatives are either dictatorial or manipulable. This clear-cut conclusion is
obtained at some costs: one of them is the assumption of universal domain, ac-
cording to which all possible preferences over alternatives are admissible for all
agents.
In many cases, the nature of the social decision problem induces a specic
structure on the set of alternatives, and this structure suggests, in turn, some
restrictions on the set of admissible individual preferences. It is then natural to
investigate how changed is the conclusion of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
when social choice functions are only required to operate on a restricted preference
domain.
Di¤erent authors have investigated the possibility of designing nondictatorial,
strategy-proof social choice functions for specic environments. Some domain re-
strictions like continuity, are not su¢ cient to avoid the incompatibility between
these two desirable properties (see Barberà and Peleg (1990)). Others allow for
more positive results. Moulin (1980), Sprumont (1991), and Alcalde and Barberà
(1994) identify situations admitting e¢ cient, nondictatorial and strategy-proof
social choice functions. Their results apply, respectively, to the choice of level for
one public good, the distribution of a xed amount of private good, and the sta-
ble solution of matching problems, under appropriate domain restrictions. Many
other environments allowing for nondictatorial and strategy-proof but not neces-
sarily e¢ cient social choice functions have been studied: see for example, Serizawa
(1996) on economies with one public and one private good, Barberà and Jackson
(1995) on exchange economies, Gibbard (1977), and Barberà, Bogomolnaia, and
van der Stel (1997) on the choice of lotteries as social outcomes.1
Another family of interesting environments arises when alternatives can be
described as points in the Euclidean space. In this paper we reconsider the pos-
sibility of designing strategy-proof social choice functions when the set of feasible
alternatives is a full dimensional compact set in <m and preferences satisfy an
1We make no attempt to be exhaustive. For accounts of recent research on strategy-proofness
in restricted domains, the reader is referred to Sprumont (1995), or Barberà (1997).
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appropriate version of single-peakedness.2 This question was addressed in a pi-
oneering paper by Border and Jordan (1983), following Moulins (1980) initial
analysis of the one-dimensional case. Border and Jordans results refer to the
case where any element of <m can be a possible outcome, and all star-shaped and
separable preferences are admissible. Their results are important, as they show
the existence of a large class of nondictatorial and strategy-proof social choice
functions for meaningful, yet restricted domains of preferences. Specically, this
class of functions, which we call generalized median voter schemes, can be in-
formally described as follows:3 (1) each agent declares her preferred alternative,
each of these ideal points is projected onto each of the coordinate axes, one point
is chosen in each coordinate, and then these coordinate values form the social
outcome vector; (2) moreover, the choice within each coordinate axis is based on
some variant of the median voter rule, which may vary from one dimension to an-
other. The rst part of this description reveals that strategy-proof rules in these
environments must be decomposable, a fact that extends to more general cases,
as shown by Le Breton and Sen (1995). The need to use generalized median voter
rules on each dimension is implied by single-peakedness.
The results of Border and Jordan (1983) were marred by the assumption that
the range of the functions was the whole Euclidean space or, equivalently, by a
unanimity requirement. In the words of Border and Jordan, the most obvious
(open) question (in their paper) is: what happens if the unanimity assumption
is dropped? Dropping the unanimity assumption is equivalent to restricting the
range of the mechanism, and in economic environments such restrictions arise as
feasibility constraints.
Before addressing this open question, let us qualify the statement. Since Bor-
der and Jordan (1983) admit preferences with ideals on any point in <m, it is
certainly the case that the range of any function dened on their admissible pro-
les and respecting unanimity must coincide with <m, and that any function
whose range is a proper subset of <m must violate unanimity, as long as all the
above preferences are admissible. Remark, however, that some restrictions on the
range (and thus, some violations of unanimity), are easy to deal with. Take, in
2Our full dimensionality condition excludes cases where the set of alternatives is nite. For
analysis of them-dimensional nite alternatives case see Barberà, Sonneschein, and Zhou (1991),
Barberà, Gul, and Stacchetti (1993), and Barberà, Massó, and Neme (1997).
3See Border and Jordan (1983), Barberà, Gul, and Stacchetti (1993), Serizawa (1994), and
Barberà, Massó, and Neme (1997) for alternative descriptions. Section 2 contains a formal
denition.
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particular, any cartesian product of one interval in each dimension, and let each
agent vote for her preferred element in this set. The same class of procedures
which were strategy-proof when any point in <m were admissible will still be
strategy-proof when the range is a cartesian product and agents are no longer
asked to vote for their preferred alternative, but for their best among those which
are feasible (i.e., in the a priorixed range). This rst remark shows that in-
troducing restrictions, or equivalently, dropping unanimity, need not always make
our analysis of strategy-proof rules any harder. It also leads us to a second re-
mark: when the set of admissible alternatives is not a cartesian product, then new
di¢ culties can arise, even if we maintain the unanimity assumption by reducing
our set of admissible preferences to those whose ideals are always feasible.
The purpose of our paper is to carefully analyze situations where the set of
feasible alternatives is not necessarily cartesian, to show the nature of the new dif-
culties that arise in this case, and to characterize the strategy-proof social choice
functions which can be dened given a set of feasible alternatives. We provide
a full characterization for the case where the domain of admissible preferences
is also restricted accordingly, thus allowing the candidate social choice functions
to respect unanimity even if their range does not cover all of <m. This charac-
terization provides a satisfactory analysis of one of the implicit issues raised by
Border and Jordan (1983). Namely, the type of di¢ culties added to the analysis
of strategy-proof rules in the presence of exogenous constraints. Our results show
that new interesting issues arise even if we reduce the domains of admissible pref-
erences in order to respect unanimity. But we certainly do not give a full answer
to Border and Jordan (1983), since we do not address the compounded di¢ culties
that arise when the range is restricted and the unanimity requirement is dropped
(or, equivalently, when the set of admissible alternatives is reduced but the set of
admissible preferences is not).
The starting point of our analysis is thus the distinction between conceivable
and feasible alternatives. Some conceivable alternatives may never be chosen
because they are unfeasible, and this may change our conclusions regarding the
possibility of designing nondictatorial, strategy-proof social choice functions. In
order to address this question in a noncircular way,4 we concentrate on functions
4Given a set Z of alternatives, it is always possible to dene social choice functions whose
range is a subset A of Z, even if all elements of Z were feasible. By identifying the range of
our social choice functions with the set of feasible alternatives we avoid discussions over why a
feasible alternative might not be chosen even in the case of unanimity, or what is the di¤erence
between objective and de facto unfeasibility.
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whose range coincides with the set of feasible alternatives, and we simply restrict
these ranges to be compact and to satisfy a full dimensionality condition.
Since the starting point of our analysis is a given set of feasible alternatives
Z, we concentrate on preferences dened on this set. Yet, our denitions of
admissible preferences will still appeal to the underlying distinction between the
set of conceivable alternatives (all points in <m) and the set Z  <m of feasible
ones. Specically, we work on the domain of preferences which are restrictions to
the set Z of multidimensional single-peaked preferences on <m, with the added
requirement that the unconstrained maximal element of these preferences belongs
to Z.5 For similar reasons, we are only interested in social choice functions which
assign a feasible outcome to any prole of admissible preferences over feasible
alternatives.
Within this setting, we obtain two major results. The rst one is that, regard-
less of the exact shape of the set of feasible alternatives, any strategy-proof social
choice function must be a generalized median voter scheme. This part of the result
is similar and builds upon the one obtained by Border and Jordan (1983), but it
requires additional work and new techniques of proof.
Notice that, when the feasible set is non-cartesian, not all generalized median
voter schemes are proper social choice functions, because some of these schemes
can recommend the choice of unfeasible alternatives even when all agents vote
for feasible alternatives. Our second result (in the line of Barberà, Massó, and
Neme (1997) for a nite framework) characterizes the set of all generalized me-
dian voter schemes which are indeed social choice functions, for each set of feasible
alternatives (we call them feasibility preserving). Border and Jordan (1983) had
stated that it seems unlikely that a transparent characterization can be devel-
oped to cover all range restrictions. Our characterization is based on what we
call the intersection property. This is a condition which guarantees the needed
coordination across decision rules which are used to select the components of the
social outcome in di¤erent dimensions. Indeed, it is not a simple condition, but
it can be sharply stated for any kind of range; its implications, however, must
be carefully analyzed for each special case. For some shapes of the range, the
intersection property can only be satised by mechanisms which give some agents
a lot of decision power. For other shapes, however, it leaves room for the use of
much nicer voting schemes. At any rate, we can show that dictatorship is hardly
a consequence of strategy-proofness. For essentially all the ranges under consid-
5This domain is strongly related to the one considered by Border and Jordan (1983). For
precise comparisons, see Denitions 1 to 4 and Remark 1 in Section 2.
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eration, it is possible to construct social choice functions which are nondictatorial
and strategy-proof: the sharp conclusion of the Gibbard- Satterthwaite Theorem
is not easily recovered under restricted domains.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the notation, denitions
and some preliminary results. In Section 3 we characterize strategy-proof social
choice functions as generalized median voter schemes. Finally, in Section 4 we
show the existence of nondictatorial rules in this class for general ranges.
2. Notation, Denitions, and Preliminary Results
Let N = f1; :::; ng be a set of agents and M = f1; :::;mg be a set of coordinates.
We assume that n;m  2.6 Let the set Z of alternatives be a compact subset of
the m dimensional Euclidean space <m endowed with the L1 norm. That is, for
x 2 <m
k x k=
X
k2M
j xk j :
We interpret <m as the set of conceivable alternatives and the set Z as the set of
feasible alternatives. We assume that Z satises the following full-dimensionality
requirement: Z = cl (int (Z)), where cl and int denotes closure and interior,
respectively.7
Given A  <m and k 2M , denote the projection of A on the k th coordinate
by Projk(A). Given k 2M , we simply write Projk(Z) = Zk. To stress the role of
coordinate k we often write the vector z as (zk; z k). Given x 2 <m and x0 2 <m,
denote the closed segment connecting x and x0 by [x; x0]. Given A  <m, the
minimal box containing A is the smallest cartesian product set B^(A) containing
the set A. That is,
B^ (A) =
Y
k2M
[minProjk(A);maxProjk(A)] :
Therefore, B^ (Z) is the smallest box containing the set of alternatives Z.
Preferences are continuous and complete preorders on alternatives. We shall
often abuse language and identify preferences with their continuous numerical
representations. We rst recall some conditions for preferences dened on <m that
6For the case m = 1, see Moulin (1980).
7This assumption is required by our techniques of proof. We believe that the essence of the
results would be kept for lower dimensional ranges, but this would require separate arguments.
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will be used as reference points. Let bU be the set of all continuous preferences on
<m.
Denition 1. A preference ui 2 bU is multidimensional single-peaked on <m if:
(1) It has a unique maximal element  (ui) 2 <m (the topof ui).
(2) For any z; z0 2 <m,h
z0 2 B^  z;   ui	 and z0 6= zi) ui (z0) > ui (z) :
This is the adaptation to continuous settings of a condition used in Barberà,
Gul, and Stacchetti (1993), Serizawa (1995), and Barberà, Massó, and Neme
(1997). Border and Jordan (1983) used the following proper subclass of preferences
on <m.
Denition 2. A preference ui 2 bU is star-shaped and separable on <m if:
(1) It has a unique maximal element  (ui) 2 <m (the topof ui).
(2) For any z 2 <m, z 6=  (ui), and  2 (0; 1),
ui
 

 
ui

> ui
 

 
ui

+ (1  ) z > ui (z) .
(3) For all k 2M , and all zk, z0k, z k, and ~z k we have that
ui (zk; z k)  ui (z0k; z k)
, ui (zk; ~z k)  ui (z0k; ~z k) :
Given the set Z of feasible alternatives we denote by UZ the set of all continuous
preferences on Z.
Denition 3. A preference ui 2 UZ is multidimensional single-peaked if there
exists u^i 2 bU such that:
(1) u^i is multidimensional single-peaked on <m and u^i (z) = ui (z) for all z 2 Z.
(2)  (u^i) 2 Z.
Denition 4. A preference ui 2 UZ is star-shaped and separable if there exists
u^i 2 bU such that:
(1) u^i is star-shaped and separable on <m and u^i (z) = ui (z) for all z 2 Z.
(2)  (u^i) 2 Z.
Let P  UZ be the set of all multidimensional single-peaked preferences and
let PS  UZ be the set of all star-shaped and separable preferences.
Notice that Denitions 3 and 4 include two parts each: (1) requires that a
preference satisfying property  on Z should come from restricting a preference
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satisfying the same condition  on <m. Condition (2) is less natural, and requires
that the original preference on <m should be saturated at a point in Z. This is a
limitation of our analysis, but it allows us to concentrate on the consequences of
dening social choice functions on any kind of range, while retaining the unanimity
assumption, as already discussed in the Introduction.
Remark 1. PS ( P.8
This remark is relevant for comparison with Border and Jordan (1983), since
we work with multidimensional single-peaked preferences, while they consider star-
shaped and separable preferences.
When we want to emphasize the role of coalition S  N we write  uS; u S
to represent the utility prole u = (u1; :::; un) 2 UnZ , where uS = (ui)i2S 2 U sZ and
u S = (ui)i2NnS 2 Un sZ .9 Given ui 2 UZ and z 2 Z, dene the upper contour set
UC (ui; z) by
UC
 
ui; z

=

z0 2 Z j ui (z0)  ui (z)	 ;
the strict upper contour set SUC (ui; z) by
SUC
 
ui; z

=

z0 2 Z j ui (z0) > ui (z)	 ;
and the lower contour set LC (ui; z) by
LC
 
ui; z

=

z0 2 Z j ui (z0)  ui (z)	 :
Given the set Z, let V  UZ denote any arbitrary subset of preferences having
a unique maximal element on Z. Obviously, P or any subset of P, are examples
of such subsets.
A social choice function F on V  UZ is a function from Vn to Z. Since our
primitives are preorders we only restrict attention to social choice functions which
are invariant to the choice of their utility representation.
Denition 5. A social choice function F : Vn ! Z respects unanimity if for any
u 2 Vn and for any z 2 Z,8i 2 N;   ui = z) [F (u) = z] :
8Notice that this inclusion holds when preferences are dened on the full <m and ideals can
be any point in <m, and thus also when preferences are dened on a set Z and their ideals are
restricted to belong to this set Z.
9The notation n  s stands for the cardinality of the set NnS. In general, we denote sets by
capital letters and their cardinality by the corresponding small letters.
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Throughout the paper we assume that F respects unanimity and therefore it
is onto Z.
A social choice function is strategy-proof if it is always in the interest of agents
to report their preferences truthfully. Formally,
Denition 6. A social choice function F : Vn ! Z is manipulable on Vn if
there exists u = (u1; :::; un) 2 Vn, i 2 N and u^i 2 V such that ui (F (u^i; u i)) >
ui (F (u)). A social choice function F : Vn ! Z is strategy-proof on Vn if it is not
manipulable on Vn.
Denition 7. A social choice function F : Vn ! Z is tops-only if for any u 2 Vn
and for any u^ 2 Vn,8i 2 N;   ui =   u^i) [F (u) = F (u^)] :
In what follows, we dene generalized median voter schemes. These are based
on a natural extension of the basic idea of the median voter rule, and their den-
ition uses the auxiliary concept of right (or left) coalition systems.
Denition 8. A right (left)-coalition system on Zk  [ak; bk] is a correspondence
Wk that assigns to every zk 2 Zk a collection Wk (zk) of coalitions satisfying the
following conditions:
(1) Voter sovereignty: For all zk 2 (ak; bk] ([ak; bk)), Wk(zk) 6= ;, ; =2 Wk(zk), and
Wk (ak) = 2Nn; (Wk (bk) = 2Nn;).
(2) Coalition monotonicity: If W 2 Wk(zk) and W  W 0, then W 0 2 Wk(zk):
(3) Outcome monotonicity: If z0k < (>)zk and W 2 Wk(zk), then W 2 Wk(z0k).
(4) Upper semicontinuity: For any W  N , any zk 2 Zk and any sequence
fztkg  Zk such that lim
t!1
ztk = zk,8t;W 2 Wk(ztk)) [W 2 Wk(zk)] :
A family R of right-coalition systems on B^ (Z) =
mQ
k=1
Zk is a collection fRkgmk=1
where each Rk is a right-coalition system on Zk. Similarly, a family L of left-
coalition systems on B^ (Z) =
mQ
k=1
Zk is a collection fLkgmk=1 where each Lk is a
left-coalition system on Zk. Now given a family of right coalition systems, let
us describe how to construct its associated generalized median voter scheme (a
parallel description holds for left coalition systems). Take the family R and a
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prole u. For each dimension k, let ( k (u1) ; :::;  k (un)) be the vector of tops
projected into dimension k. Now, choose the k-th component Fk (u) of the social
outcome to be the largest value such that the set of agents voting for values above
it belong to the right coalition at Fk (u). In this way, given a preference prole
u = (u1; :::; un) and a right-coalition system R = fRkgmk=1, one selects the social
outcome F (u) = (F1 (u) ; :::; Fm (u)). Formally,
Denition 9. Let Z be the set of alternatives and R = fRkgmk=1 (L = fLkgmk=1)
a family of right (left)-coalition systems on B^ (Z). The generalized median voter
scheme induced by (Z;R) is the function F : Vn ! B^ (Z) dened as follows: for
every u 2 Vn and every k 2M
Fk(u) = max

zk 2 Zk j

i 2 N j  k
 
ui
  zk	 2 Rk(zk)	
(Fk(u) = min

zk 2 Zk j

i 2 N j  k
 
ui
  zk	 2 Lk(zk)	):
Remark 2. By (4) in the denition of right-coalition systems, the outcome
Fk (u) is well determined since max fzk 2 Zk j fi 2 N j  k (ui)  zkg 2 Rk(zk)g
exists. Notice that by denition generalized median voter schemes are tops-only.
When a coalition W  N is in Rk (zk) (Lk (zk)) for k 2 M and zk 2 Zk, the
coalition is said to be right (left) winning for zk.
Notice that, in general, the image of a generalized median voter scheme be-
longs to B^ (Z) but not necessarily to Z (see Example 1 below). Thus, generalized
median voter schemes are not always social choice functions. An important par-
ticular case arises when Z is a cartesian product. Then, B^ (Z) = Z, and any
generalized median voter scheme is a social choice function. Border and Jordan
(1983) analyzed the particular case within this class, when Z equals <m. What
is important for their result is the fact that Z is a cartesian product, and we
formulate their result in this slightly generalized form.
Theorem 2.1. (Border and Jordan): Let the set Z of alternatives be box-shaped.
A social choice function is strategy-proof on (PS)n, the set of star-shaped and
separable preferences, if and only if it is a generalized median voter scheme.
Since we choose to work with multidimensional single-peaked preferences,
rather than star-shaped and separable, it is worth checking that a result par-
allel to Border and Jordans also holds for our domain. This is the contents of
Theorem 2.2 below. Notice that, even if PS ( P, none of the two results is implied
by the other.
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Theorem 2.2. Let the set Z of alternatives be box-shaped. A social choice func-
tion is strategy-proof on Pn, the set of multidimensional single-peaked preferences,
if and only if it is a generalized median voter scheme.
Proof. To show that a generalized median voter scheme is strategy-proof on
Pn is straightforward, and therefore it is omitted. Let a social choice function F
be strategy-proof on Pn. We will establish that F is a generalized median voter
scheme. Let F^ be the restriction of F to (PS)n. Since F^ is strategy-proof on
(PS)n, it follows from Theorem 2.1 that F^ is a generalized median voter scheme.
Now, we have only to show that for any u 2 Pn and u^ 2 (PS)n, if  (ui) =  (u^i)
for each i 2 N , F (u) = F (u^).
Let u 2 Pn and u^ 2 (PS)n be such that for each i 2 N ,  (ui) =  (u^i). To get a
contradiction, suppose that F (u1; u^ 1) 6= F (u^). If F (u^) =2 B^ (f (u^1) ; F (u1; u^ 1)g),
there is ~u1 2 PS such that  (~u1) =  (u^1) and ~u1 (F (u1; u^ 1)) > ~u1 (F (u^)).
Since F (~u1; u^ 1) = F (u^), this contradicts strategy-proofness for agent 1. Thus,
F (u^) 2 B^ (f (u^1) ; F (u1; u^ 1)g). Since u1 2 P, u1 (F (u^)) > u1 (F (u1; u^ 1)),
contradicting strategy-proofness. Therefore, F (u1; u^ 1) = F (u^). By repeating
the same argument for i = 2; :::; n, we have that F (u^) = F (u).
Let us now return to our main concern: the extension of the above results to
non-cartesian ranges. As already noted, when Z ( B^ (Z) nothing guarantees that
the vector (F1 (u) ; :::; Fm (u)) selected throughout an arbitrary family of right-
coalition systems R = fRkgmk=1 will be an element of Z.10 The following example
shows that not any generalized median voter scheme, as dened previously, will
preserve feasibility if Z is not box-shaped.
Example 1. Consider the case where the set of coordinates is M = f1; 2g,
the set of alternatives is Z =

z 2 <2+ j z1 + z2  1
	
, and the set of agents is
N = f1; 2; 3g. Notice that Z ( B^ (Z) = z 2 <2+ j z1  1; z2  1	. Let R =
fR1;R2g be the family of right-coalition systems on B^ (Z) where [W 2 R1 (z1)],
[#W  2] for all z1 2 (0; 1], [W 2 R2 (z2)] , [#W  1] for all z2 2 (0; 1], and
R1 (0) = R2 (0) = 2Nn;.11 Consider now any prole u = (u1; u2; u3) 2 P3 such
that  (u1) = (5=8; 2=8),  (u2) = (4=8; 2=8), and  (u3) = (2=8; 5=8). Obviously,
10See Barberà, Massó, and Neme (1997) for a detailed discussion of the feasibility problem in
the context of nite sets of alternatives.
11This is a particular case, called voting by quota, where winning coalitions are constant and
dened just by its cardinality. In this example we would say that the generalized median voter
scheme F dened by those right-coalition systems is an scheme of voting by quota 2 in the rst
coordinate and voting by quota 1 in the second one.
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 (ui) 2 Z for all i = 1; 2; 3. Now, since ( 1 (u1) ;  1 (u2) ;  1 (u3)) = (5=8; 4=8; 2=8)
and ( 2 (u1) ;  2 (u2) ;  2 (u3)) = (2=8; 2=8; 5=8) we have that F (u) = (4=8; 5=8) =2
Z.
Therefore, we need some additional property to guarantee that a generalized
median voter scheme always selects vectors in Z. In order to state this property,
it is useful to understand the relationship between right and left coalition systems,
Rk and Lk, that select the same outcome for all ( k (u1) ; :::;  k (un)).
Given Rk, dene Lk as follows:
Lk (zk) =

W 2 2N j 8z0k > zk;8W 0 2 Rk (z0k) ;W \W 0 6= ;
	
:
Is is easy to see thatRk and Lk will select the same outcome for all ( k (ui))i2N
if and only if Lk = Lk.
For any pair of vectors y; z 2 B^ (Z), let M+(y; z) = fk 2M j zk > ykg and
M (y; z) = fk 2M j zk < ykg be the set of dimensions in which the components
of z are strictly greater or smaller than those of y, respectively.
Denition 10. A family R = fRkgmk=1of right-coalition systems on B^ (Z) has
the intersection property for Z if for any y 2 B^ (Z) nZ, and any nite subset
z1; :::; zT
	  Z
T\
t=1
8<:[ [
k2M+(y;zt)
lk (yk)]
[
[
[
k2M (y;zt)
rk (yk)]
9=; 6= ;
for every rk (yk) 2 Rk(yk) with k 2
TS
t=1
M  (y; zt) and every lk (yk) 2 Lk(yk) with
k 2
TS
t=1
M+ (y; zt).
A generalized median voter scheme induced by (Z;R) satises the intersection
property if and only if R has the intersection property for Z.
The following Proposition gives a necessary and su¢ cient condition for a gen-
eralized median voter scheme induced by (Z;R) to be a social choice function.
We state it without proof since the proof of Theorem 1 in Barberà, Massó, and
Neme (1997) for the nite case can be straigthtforwardly adapted to our setting.
Proposition 1. A generalized median voter scheme induced by (Z;R) is a social
choice function if and only if it satises the intersection property.
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To illustrate the intersection property, consider again Example 1. We will check
that the generalized median voter scheme induced by (Z;R) dened there does not
satisfy the intersection property. Consider the vectors y = (3=4; 3=4) 2 B^ (Z) nZ,
z1 = (3=4; 1=4) 2 Z, and z2 = (1=8; 3=4) 2 Z. In this case M+ (z1; y) =
fk 2M j z1k > ykg = ;, M  (z1; y) = fk 2M j z1k < ykg = f2g, M+ (z2; y) =
fk 2M j z2k > ykg = ;, and M  (z2; y) = fk 2M j z2k < ykg = f1g. Then,
M+ (z1; y) [M+ (z2; y) = ; and M  (z1; y) [M  (z2; y) = f1; 2g. But f1; 2g 2
R1 (y1), f3g 2 R2 (y2), and f1; 2g\f3g = ;, which is a violation of the intersection
property. However, as we will see in Example 2 of Section 4, if we replace R2,
the right coalition system of the second dimension, by R02 where [W 2 R02 (z2)],
[#W  2] for all z2 2 (0; 1], and R02 (0) = 2Nn; , then R0 = fR1;R02g has the
intersection property for Z.
3. The Characterization Result
We can now state and prove the main result of the paper.
Theorem 3.1. A social choice function is strategy-proof on Pn if and only if it
is a generalized median voter scheme satisfying the intersection property.
The proof of Theorem 3.1 uses two interesting facts which are presented as
Lemmata and the following concept of option sets.
Given a social choice function F : Vn ! Z, a coalition N 0 ( N and uN 0 =
(ui)i2N 0 2 Vn0, dene the option set left by uN 0 as
F (uN
0
) =
n
z 2 Z j there exists u N 0 2 Vn n0 such that F

uN
0
; u N
0

= z
o
:
Lemma 1 below says that if F is strategy-proof on an arbitrary domain Vn 
UnZ ,12 z is among the options left by uN 0, and z is maximal for all agents in NnN 0,
then z must be chosen by F . Notice that it implies respect for unanimity when
N 0 = ;. We omit the proof, which is straightforward.
Lemma 1. Let F : Vn ! Z be a strategy-proof social choice function. Let
N 0  N , uN 0 2 Vn0, z 2 F  uN 0 and u N 0 2 Vn n0 be such that for each
j 2 NnN 0,  (uj) = z. Then F (u) = z.
12Notice that single-peakedness does not play any role here.
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Lemma 2 states that if F is strategy-proof on the domain of multidimensional
single-peaked preferences Pn and for some prole the maximal alternatives of all
agents lie in a box within the range, then the outcome must belong to that box.
We will say then that F satises the Weak Minimal Box Property.
Lemma 2. (Weak Minimal Box Property) Let F : Pn ! Z be a strategy-proof
social choice function, u 2 Pn, and B^ (f (ui) j i 2 Ng)  Z. Then F (u) 2
B^ (f (ui) j i 2 Ng).
Proof. Let u 2 Pn, z = F (u) and k 2M . We have to show that min
i2N
f k (ui)g 
zk  max
i2N
f k (ui)g. By contradiction, suppose not. Without loss of generality,
we may assume that k = 1 and z1 < min
i2N
f 1 (ui)g =  1 (u1). Let z 2 <m
be such that z1 = min
i2N
f 1 (ui)g; and for each k0 2 M , zk0 = min
i2N
f k0 (ui)g if
zk0 < min
i2N
f k0 (ui)g, zk0 = zk0 if min
i2N
f k0 (ui)g  zk0  max
i2N
f k0 (ui)g, zk0 =
max
i2N
f k0 (ui)g if zk0 > max
i2N
f k0 (ui)g. Since z 2 B^ (f (ui) j i 2 Ng), it follows
from B^ (f (ui) j i 2 Ng)  Z that z 2 Z. Note that for any i 2 N , k z  
 (ui) k=k z   z k + k  (ui)   z k. Thus for any i 2 N , there is u^i 2 P such
that  (u^i) = z and LC (ui; z)\UC (u^i; z) = fzg. Then the fact that agent 1 can
not manipulate F and F (u) = z together imply F (u^1; u 1) = z. Repeating this
argument for i = 2; :::; n, we get F (u^) = z. But since z 2 Z, this contradicts
respect for unanimity, and by Lemma 1, strategy-proofness of F .
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Since the ifpart is straightforward, we will show
the converse. Let F be a strategy-proof social choice function. To establish that
F : Pn ! Z is a generalized median voter scheme on Z we proceed as follows. For
each z in the interior of Z, we select a box containing z and strictly contained in Z
(here, we use the full dimensionality of Z). Lemma 2 allows us to apply Theorem
2.2 locally to each one of these boxes, whose union constitutes the interior of
Z. From this we get a collection of generalized median voter schemes, one for
each box, and we use an overlapping argument to show that, in fact, they are all
restrictions of a common generalized median voter scheme dened on the interior
of the minimal box containing Z. Finally, we use continuity to show that this
generalized median voter scheme still applies when we consider the boundaries of
Z, as well as the interior. Notice that although Theorem 3.1 extends Border and
Jordans result, our proof uses their result initially, when we apply it locally to
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the boxes associated to each z. Therefore, our proof builds upon theirs, and is
not an alternative to it.
To proceed formally with the proof, let I be the interior of Z and PI =
fui 2 P j (ui) 2 Ig, and let F I be the restriction of F to  PIn.
Claim: F I is a generalized median voter scheme on I.
Proof of the Claim: Let B be a non-degenerate box contained in Z and
PB = fui 2 P j (ui) 2 Bg. Then by the weak minimal box property (Lemma 2),
for any u 2 PnB, F (u) 2 B; and by respect for unanimity (Lemma 1), for any
z 2 B, there is u 2 PnB such that F (u) = z. Thus the restriction of F to PnB
is considered to be a social choice function with a box-shaped set of alternatives.
Then, Theorem 2.2 is applied, which implies that the restriction of F to PnB is a
generalized median voter scheme on B, so that there is a family of right-coalition
systems associated with it, call it RB. For any non-degenerate box in Z, the
associated family of right-coalition systems is derived similarly. For any z 2 I,
there is a non-degenerate box B  Z such that z is in the interior of B, thus
for each k 2 M , a set of winning coalitions RBk (zk) is derived. We establish (3)
(outcome monotonicity) between the associated lists of winning coalitions.
Let k 2 M , z 2 I and z0 2 I be such that zk  z0k. Let B and B0 be
non-degenerated boxes in Z such that z and z0 are in the interiors of B and B0
respectively. Let RBk (zk) and RB0k (z0k) be the lists of winning coalitions associated
with B and B0 respectively. Let W 2 RBk (zk). We want to show W 2 RB0k (z0k).
Let x 2 B, y 2 B, x0 2 B0 and y0 2 B0 be such that yk < zk < xk, y0k < z0k < x0k,
y k = x k, and y0 k = x
0
 k. Let u 2 PnB be such that  (ui) = x for any i 2 W and
 (ui) = y for any i =2 W . Let u0 2 PnB0 be such that for any i and j 2 W , u0i = u0j,
 (u0i) = x0, and u0i (z00) > ui (z000) for any z00 2 Z and z000 2 Z with z000k < z0k and
x0k  z00k , and  (u0i) = y0 for any i =2 W . SinceW 2 RBk (zk), Fk (u)  zk. Without
loss of generality, let NnW = f1; :::; n   wg and W = fn   w + 1; :::; ng, where
w = #W .
We will show that Fk (u01; u 1)  zk. By contradiction, suppose not. Then
there is u^1 2 PB such that  (u^1) = y and u^1 (F (u01; u 1)) > u^1 (z00) for z00 2 Z
with z00k  zk. Since generalized median voter scheme are tops-only, F (u^1; u 1) =
F (u). Thus u^1 (F (u01; u 1)) > u^1 (F (u^1; u 1)), contradicting strategy-proofness.
Therefore Fk (u01; u 1)  zk. Next we will show that if 2 =2 W , Fk
 
u01; u02; u f1;2g
 
zk. Let 2 =2 W . Suppose not. Then there is u^2 2 PB such that  (u^2) = y and
u^2
 
F
 
u01; u02; u f1;2g

> u^2 (z00) for z00 2 Z with z00k  zk. Since generalized
median voter schemes are tops-only, F (u^2; u 2) = F (u). Thus we can show
that Fk
 
u01; u^2; u f1;2g
  zk in the same way we showed that Fk (u01; u 1)  zk.
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Thus u^2
 
F
 
u01; u02; u f1;2g

> u^2
 
F
 
u01; u^2; u f1;2g

, contradicting strategy-
proofness. Therefore Fk
 
u01; u02; u f1;2g
  zk. Repeating this argument for
i = 3; :::; n  w, we can show that Fk
 
u0NnW ; uW
  zk:
Since for any i 2 W , u0i (z00) > ui (z000) for any z00 2 Z and z000 2 Z with
z000k < z
0
k and x
0
k  z00k , if Fk
 
u0NnW ; u0n w+1; uWnfn w+1g

< z0k, then it follows
that u0n w+1
 
F
 
u0NnW ; u0n w+1; uWnfn w+1g

< u0n w+1
 
F
 
u0NnW ; uW

. This
contradicts strategy-proofness. Therefore Fk
 
u0NnW ; u0n w+1; uWnfn w+1g
  z0k.
By the same condition as above, Fk
 
u0NnW ; u0n w+1; u0n w+2; uWnfn w+1;n w+2g
 
z0k because u
0n w+2 = u0n w+1. Repeating this argument for i = n w+3; :::; n, we
can show that Fk (u0)  z0k. AccordinglyW 2 RB0k (z0k). It is easy to check that the
other conditions required for a coalition system hold. Hence F I is a generalized
median voter scheme on I, which proves the Claim.
To nish the proof of the Theorem, let G be a generalized median voter scheme
on Z such that for any u 2  PIn, G (u) = F I (u). Since the family of right
coalition systems are upper semicontinuous and satisfy outcome monotonicity,
G is unique. We need to establish that F = G. Let u 2 Pn. We want to
show that F (u) = G (u). Suppose not. We derive a contradiction by induc-
tion. When  (ui) 2 I for all i 2 N , F (u) = G (u). As induction hypoth-
esis, assume that when the number of agents whose top elements are in ZnI
is less than n0( n), F (u) = G (u). Let the number of agents whose top ele-
ments are in ZnI be equal to n0. Without loss of generality, we may let that
 (u1) 2 ZnI. Since Z is compact and has full dimension, there is a sequence
fu^1tg1t=1 such that u^1t 2 PI for all t  1 and  (u^1t ) goes to  (u1) as t goes in-
nity. It follows from the induction hypothesis that F (u^1t ; u
 1) = G (u^1t ; u
 1)
for all t. Since G is continuous, limt!1 F (u^1t ; u
 1) = G (u). Note that G (u) 2
B^ (f (u1) ; F (u)g) or G (u) =2 B^ (f (u1) ; F (u)g). First consider the case that
G (u) 2 B^ (f (u1) ; F (u)g). Since F (u) 6= G (u) implies u1 (G (u)) > u1 (F (u)),
it follows from limt!1 F (u^1t ; u
 1) = G (u) that u1 (F (u^1t ; u
 1)) > u1 (F (u)) for
t su¢ ciently large. This is a contradiction to strategy-proofness. Next consider
the case where G (u) =2 B^ (f (u1) ; F (u)g). Since limt!1 F (u^1t ; u 1) = G (u),
F (u^1t ; u
 1) =2 B^ (f (u1) ; F (u)g) for t su¢ ciently large. Then there is ~u1 2 Pn
such that  (~u1) =  (u^1t ) and ~u
1
t (F (u)) > ~u
1
t (F (u^
1
t ; u
 1)). Since G is tops-only,
F (~u1t ; u
 1) = F (u^1t ; u
 1). Thus ~u1t (F (u)) > ~u
1
t (F (~u
1
t ; u
 1)). This is a contradic-
tion to strategy-proofness.
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4. The Existence of Non Dictatorial Social Choice Functions
for General Ranges
The shape of the set of alternatives Z will determine the subclass of generalized
median voter schemes which can actually be a social choice functions onto this set.
Specically, this will only hold for schemes which satisfy the intersection property,
a condition whose bite depends on the shape of Z. In this section we present a
set of examples to illustrate the fact that, although restrictive, the intersection
property may allow for some reasonable schemes. Moreover, we show by example
that it will not in general precipitate the existence of full dictators.
We start by showing that, when Z is a triangular set, then there exist
anonymous voting schemes which are social choice functions onto Z. We are in-
tentionally avoiding the budget setvocabulary because it may suggest a setting
where preferences over the underlying universal set of alternatives are among other
things monotonic. Remember that here we are always dealing with preferences
saturated on the set Z
Example 2. Consider the family of problems where the set of feasible alterna-
tives Z can be described as a triangularset; that is, given an strictly positive
vector x = (x1; :::; xm) 2 <m++, and an strictly positive number X > 0, the set of
feasible alternatives is dened by
Z =
(
z 2 <m+ j
mX
k=1
xkzk  X
)
.
Notice again that Z ( B^ (Z) =

z 2 <m+ j zk  X=xk for all k = 1; :::;m
	
.13 The
scheme of voting by quota Q, where 1  Q  n, can be dened by the family of
right-coalition systems R = fRkgmk=1 on B^ (Z), where for all k = 1; :::;m,
[W 2 Rk (zk)] , [#W  Q] for zk 2 (0; X=xk] , and
Rk (0) = 2Nn;.
Now, to determine the values of Q for which R has the intersection property for
Z, notice that it is su¢ cient to look at the property only for any y 2 B^ (Z) nZ
such that y  0 and for the subset of feasible alternatives fz1; :::; zmg  Z, where
for all t = 1; :::;m, the vector zt is dened as follows: ztk = yk if t = k, and
13The case considered in Example 1 is a triangularset for m = 2 and x1 = x2 = X = 1.
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ztk = 0 if t 6= k.14 In this case, and since yk > 0 for all k = 1; ::;m, we have
that M+ (y; zt) = ; and M  (y; zt) = Mn ftg for all t = 1; :::;m. Therefore, the
intersection property says that
m\
t=1
8<: [
k2Mnftg
rk (yk)
9=; 6= ;
for every rk (yk) 2 Rk (yk), which implies, by an induction argument on m, that
mQ > (m  1)n. For instance, if m = 2 and n = 3, as in Example 1, Q = 2
and Q = 3 are the two quotas satisfying the intersection property for Z. In the
other hand, for large m and n smaller than m, the unique quota satisfying the
intersection property for Z is Q = n; that is, unanimity on the right (or vetoer
on the left).
The preceding example is quite positive, since it gives equal power to all agents
and it is thus very far from dictatorship. Yet, it may require almost unanimity to
change decisions at all levels and for all dimensions. Our next example will exhibit
another family of rules, still dened on triangularsets. Here, we have freedom
to choose any structure for the coalition systems, on some cartesian subset Z of
the range Z, while requiring unanimous agreement to make decisions which would
lead to outcomes outside Z.
Example 3. Suppose now that m = 2 and the set of feasible alternatives is
Z =

(z1; z2) 2 <2+ j x1z1 + x2z2  X
	
given x1; x2; X > 0. Now, choose any
(z1; z2) 2 Z, and consider any family of right-coalition systems fR1;R2g on
[0; X=x1]  [0; X=x2] such that R1 (z1) = fNg for z1 2 (z1; X=x1] and R2 (z2) =
fNg for z2 2 (z2; X=x2]. Then, the generalized median voter scheme induced by
(Z;R) is a social choice function F onto Z. This is clearly the case, since (1)
the outcome will always belong to Z =

(z1; z2) 2 <2+ j z1  z1; z2  z2
	
when-
ever (mini2N  1 (ui) ;mini2N  2 (ui)) 2 Z and (2) the outcome will belong to Zn Z
otherwise. Hence, F is a social choice function onto Z.
Notice that, with the same triangularset, we can have di¤erent social choice
functions depending on (a) our choice of (z1; z2) within the triangularset and
(b) the choice of the right-coalition systems below those critical values.
Notice also that the same construction could be generalized tom dimensions by
taking any box-shaped set Z contained in the triangularset, requiring unanimity
to get out of Z and letting any generalized median voter scheme within the bounds
14See Barberà, Massó, and Neme (1997) for a full discussion of this su¢ ciency.
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of Z. Moreover, the construction can easily be generalized to any convex set Z.
Just take a box Z inside Z, dened by upper and lower bounds (zk; zk) for each
dimension k, and take any generalized median voter scheme dened by R and L
such that for all k = 1; :::;m: Lk (zk) = fNg for zk < zk and Rk (zk) = fNg for
zk > zk. We leave it for the reader to check that this generalized median voter
scheme induced by (Z;R) will be a strategy-proof social choice function onto Z.
Finally, we present an example involving sets of quite arbitrary shape. The
purpose of the example is to show that, even in very strange cases, full dictatorship
is not a consequence of strategy proofness. Clearly, the functions we describe give a
lot of power to one individual, and we do not claim that they are attractive. But
the example certainly proves that sharp statements à la Gibbard-Satterthwaite
are not to be expected in our context, and that each individual decision problem
attached to a feasible set of alternatives Z will require its own careful examination.
Example 4. Let Z be any given compact set in <2 satisfying our full dimen-
sionality requirement. For our construction to work, we must be able to nd a
box B = f(z1; z2) 2 <2 j x1  z1  x1; x2  z2  x2g such that for all elements
z 2 ZnB we have that all points in the segment between z and the projection of z
on B (call it Pr z) belong to Z. Figure 1 shows that several such B can be found
for a given, and rather complicated shape of Z.
Figure 1
Now, consider the generalized median voter scheme induced by (Z;R) where
for k = 1; 2:
Rk (zk) = fS  N j 1 2 Sg for xk  zk  xk,
Rk (zk) = fNg for zk > xk, and
Lk (zk) = fNg for zk < xk.
In words, agent 1 is a dictator on the set Z\B and a unanimous decision is required
to go away from this set. Again, this is a globally nondictatorial strategy-proof
social choice function onto Z. As already stated, we do not present this rule as
a wonderful one. Rather, it is to make the point that full dictatorship is hard to
obtain.
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